[Git][java-team/jackson-databind][stretch] 5 commits: Import Debian changes 2.8.6-1+deb9u8

Markus Koschany (@apo) gitlab at salsa.debian.org
Mon May 2 17:20:15 BST 2022



Markus Koschany pushed to branch stretch at Debian Java Maintainers / jackson-databind


Commits:
dfca3993 by Chris Lamb at 2022-05-01T23:12:49+02:00
Import Debian changes 2.8.6-1+deb9u8

jackson-databind (2.8.6-1+deb9u8) stretch-security; urgency=high
..
  * CVE-2020-25649: Prevent an external entity expansion vulnerability in the
    DOM serializer.

- - - - -
e260e5b3 by Utkarsh Gupta at 2022-05-01T23:13:01+02:00
Import Debian changes 2.8.6-1+deb9u9

jackson-databind (2.8.6-1+deb9u9) stretch-security; urgency=high
..
  * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS team.
  * Add patch to fix:
    - CVE-2020-24616: Block one more gadget type (Anteros-DBCP)
    - CVE-2020-24750: Block one more gadget type
                      (com.pastdev.httpcomponents)
    - CVE-2020-35490 and CVE-2020-35491: Block 2 more gadget
                      types (commons-dbcp2)
    - CVE-2020-35728: Block one more gadget type
                      (org.glassfish.web/javax.servlet.jsp.jstl)
    - CVE-2020-36179, CVE-2020-36180, CVE-2020-36181, and
      CVE-2020-36182: Block some more DBCP-related potential
                      gadget classes
    - CVE-2020-36183: Block one more gadget type
                      (org.docx4j.org.apache:xalan-interpretive)
    - CVE-2020-36184 and CVE-2020-36185: Block 2 more gadget
                      types (org.apache.tomcat/tomcat-dbcp)
    - CVE-2020-36186 and CVE-2020-36187: Block 2 more gadget
                      types (tomcat/naming-factory-dbcp)
    - CVE-2020-36188 and CVE-2020-36189: Block 2 more gadget
                      types (newrelic-agent)
    - CVE-2021-20190: Block one more gadget type (javax.swing)

- - - - -
96dcbb68 by Markus Koschany at 2022-05-02T17:34:02+02:00
Add CVE-2020-36518.patch

- - - - -
29c8b041 by Markus Koschany at 2022-05-02T17:35:56+02:00
Update changelog

- - - - -
19f6e54d by Markus Koschany at 2022-05-02T18:07:56+02:00
Fix test case for CVE-2020-36518

- - - - -


7 changed files:

- debian/changelog
- + debian/patches/CVE-2020-24{616,750}.patch
- + debian/patches/CVE-2020-25649.patch
- + debian/patches/CVE-2020-35{490,491,728}.patch
- + debian/patches/CVE-2020-361{79-90}.patch
- + debian/patches/CVE-2020-36518.patch
- debian/patches/series


Changes:

=====================================
debian/changelog
=====================================
@@ -1,3 +1,45 @@
+jackson-databind (2.8.6-1+deb9u10) stretch-security; urgency=high
+
+  * Team upload.
+  * Fix CVE-2020-36518:
+     - Fix CVE-2020-36518: Java StackOverflow exception and denial of service
+       via a large depth of nested objects.
+
+ -- Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>  Mon, 02 May 2022 17:34:10 +0200
+
+jackson-databind (2.8.6-1+deb9u9) stretch-security; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS team.
+  * Add patch to fix:
+    - CVE-2020-24616: Block one more gadget type (Anteros-DBCP)
+    - CVE-2020-24750: Block one more gadget type
+                      (com.pastdev.httpcomponents)
+    - CVE-2020-35490 and CVE-2020-35491: Block 2 more gadget
+                      types (commons-dbcp2)
+    - CVE-2020-35728: Block one more gadget type
+                      (org.glassfish.web/javax.servlet.jsp.jstl)
+    - CVE-2020-36179, CVE-2020-36180, CVE-2020-36181, and
+      CVE-2020-36182: Block some more DBCP-related potential
+                      gadget classes
+    - CVE-2020-36183: Block one more gadget type
+                      (org.docx4j.org.apache:xalan-interpretive)
+    - CVE-2020-36184 and CVE-2020-36185: Block 2 more gadget
+                      types (org.apache.tomcat/tomcat-dbcp)
+    - CVE-2020-36186 and CVE-2020-36187: Block 2 more gadget
+                      types (tomcat/naming-factory-dbcp)
+    - CVE-2020-36188 and CVE-2020-36189: Block 2 more gadget
+                      types (newrelic-agent)
+    - CVE-2021-20190: Block one more gadget type (javax.swing)
+
+ -- Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh at debian.org>  Sun, 25 Apr 2021 00:23:13 +0530
+
+jackson-databind (2.8.6-1+deb9u8) stretch-security; urgency=high
+
+  * CVE-2020-25649: Prevent an external entity expansion vulnerability in the
+    DOM serializer.
+
+ -- Chris Lamb <lamby at debian.org>  Wed, 14 Oct 2020 11:15:52 +0100
+
 jackson-databind (2.8.6-1+deb9u7) stretch; urgency=medium
 
   * Add multiple-CVE-BeanDeserializerFactory.patch and block more classes from


=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2020-24{616,750}.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 3d97153944f7de9c19c1b3637b33d3cf1fbbe4d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tatu Saloranta <tatu.saloranta at iki.fi>
+Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 19:39:03 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a block for #2814
+
+From 6cc9f1a1af323cd156f5668a47e43bab324ae16f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tatu Saloranta <tatu.saloranta at iki.fi>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 17:40:57 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Work for addressing #2798
+
+Co-Author: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh at debian.org>
+
+--- a/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java
++++ b/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java
+@@ -160,9 +160,11 @@
+         // [databind#2631]: shaded hikari-config
+         s.add("org.apache.hadoop.shaded.com.zaxxer.hikari.HikariConfig");
+ 
+-        // [databind#2634]: ibatis-sqlmap, anteros-core
++        // [databind#2634]: ibatis-sqlmap, anteros-core/-dbcp
+         s.add("com.ibatis.sqlmap.engine.transaction.jta.JtaTransactionConfig");
+         s.add("br.com.anteros.dbcp.AnterosDBCPConfig");
++        // [databind#2814]: anteros-dbcp
++        s.add("br.com.anteros.dbcp.AnterosDBCPDataSource");
+ 
+         // [databind#2642]: javax.swing (jdk)
+         s.add("javax.swing.JEditorPane");
+@@ -219,6 +221,9 @@
+         // [databind#2764]: org.jsecurity:
+         s.add("org.jsecurity.realm.jndi.JndiRealmFactory");
+ 
++        // [databind#2798]: com.pastdev.httpcomponents:
++        s.add("com.pastdev.httpcomponents.configuration.JndiConfiguration");
++
+         DEFAULT_NO_DESER_CLASS_NAMES = Collections.unmodifiableSet(s);
+     }
+ 


=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2020-25649.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--- jackson-databind-2.8.6.orig/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/ext/DOMDeserializer.java
++++ jackson-databind-2.8.6/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/ext/DOMDeserializer.java
+@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ public abstract class DOMDeserializer<T>
+             // 14-Jul-2016, tatu: Not sure how or why, but during code coverage runs
+             //   (via Cobertura) we get `java.lang.AbstractMethodError` so... ignore that too
+         }
++
++        // [databind#2589] add two more settings just in case
++        try {
++            parserFactory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
++        } catch (Throwable t) { } // as per previous one, nothing much to do
++        try {
++            parserFactory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
++        } catch (Throwable t) { } // as per previous one, nothing much to do
+         DEFAULT_PARSER_FACTORY = parserFactory;
+     }
+ 


=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2020-35{490,491,728}.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 41b8bdb5ccc1d8edb71acf1c8234da235a24249d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tatu Saloranta <tatu.saloranta at iki.fi>
+Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2020 17:27:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed #2986
+
+From 1ca0388c2fb37ac6a06f1c188ae89c41e3e15e84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tatu Saloranta <tatu.saloranta at iki.fi>
+Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2020 14:20:53 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed #2999
+
+Co-Author: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh at debian.org>
+
+--- a/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java
++++ b/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java
+@@ -224,6 +224,14 @@
+         // [databind#2798]: com.pastdev.httpcomponents:
+         s.add("com.pastdev.httpcomponents.configuration.JndiConfiguration");
+ 
++        // [databind#2986]: dbcp2
++        s.add("org.apache.commons.dbcp2.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource");
++        s.add("org.apache.commons.dbcp2.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource");
++
++        // [databind#2999]: org.glassfish.web/javax.servlet.jsp.jstl (embedded Xalan)
++        // (derivative of #2469)
++        s.add("com.oracle.wls.shaded.org.apache.xalan.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool");
++
+         DEFAULT_NO_DESER_CLASS_NAMES = Collections.unmodifiableSet(s);
+     }
+ 


=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2020-361{79-90}.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+Description: Multiple fixes (CVE-2020-36179 to CVE-2020-36190)
+ cherry-picked together from upstream.
+From: Tatu Saloranta <tatu.saloranta at iki.fi>
+Co-Author: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh at debian.org>
+
+--- a/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java
++++ b/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java
+@@ -141,9 +141,12 @@
+         // [databind#2704]: xalan2
+         s.add("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool");
+ 
+-        // [databind#2478]: comons-dbcp, p6spy
++        // [databind#2478]: commons-dbcp 1.x, p6spy
++        // [databind#3004]: commons-dbcp 1.x
++        s.add("org.apache.commons.dbcp.cpdsadapter.DriverAdapterCPDS");
+         s.add("org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource");
+         s.add("org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource");
++
+         s.add("com.p6spy.engine.spy.P6DataSource");
+ 
+         // [databind#2498]: log4j-extras (1.2)
+@@ -166,8 +169,9 @@
+         // [databind#2814]: anteros-dbcp
+         s.add("br.com.anteros.dbcp.AnterosDBCPDataSource");
+ 
+-        // [databind#2642]: javax.swing (jdk)
++        // [databind#2642][databind#2854]: javax.swing (jdk)
+         s.add("javax.swing.JEditorPane");
++        s.add("javax.swing.JTextPane");
+ 
+         // [databind#2648], [databind#2653]: shire-core
+         s.add("org.apache.shiro.realm.jndi.JndiRealmFactory");
+@@ -206,8 +210,11 @@
+         // [databind#2682]: commons-jelly
+         s.add("org.apache.commons.jelly.impl.Embedded");
+ 
+-        // [databind#2688]: apache/drill
++        // [databind#2688], [databind#3004]: apache/drill
+         s.add("oadd.org.apache.xalan.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool");
++        s.add("oadd.org.apache.commons.dbcp.cpdsadapter.DriverAdapterCPDS");
++        s.add("oadd.org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource");
++        s.add("oadd.org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource");
+ 
+         // [databind#2698]: weblogic w/ oracle/aq-jms
+         // (note: dependency not available via Maven Central, but as part of
+@@ -224,14 +231,35 @@
+         // [databind#2798]: com.pastdev.httpcomponents:
+         s.add("com.pastdev.httpcomponents.configuration.JndiConfiguration");
+ 
+-        // [databind#2986]: dbcp2
++        // [databind#2986], [databind#3004]: dbcp2
++        s.add("org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp.cpdsadapter.DriverAdapterCPDS");
+         s.add("org.apache.commons.dbcp2.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource");
+         s.add("org.apache.commons.dbcp2.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource");
+ 
++        // [databind#2996]: newrelic-agent + embedded-logback-core
++        // (derivative of #2334 and #2389)
++        s.add("com.newrelic.agent.deps.ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource");
++        s.add("com.newrelic.agent.deps.ch.qos.logback.core.db.DriverManagerConnectionSource");
++
++        // [databind#2997]/[databind#3004]: tomcat/naming-factory-dbcp (embedded dbcp 1.x)
++        // (derivative of #2478)
++        s.add("org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp.cpdsadapter.DriverAdapterCPDS");
++        s.add("org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource");
++        s.add("org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource");
++
++        // [databind#2998]/[databind#3004]: org.apache.tomcat/tomcat-dbcp (embedded dbcp 2.x)
++        // (derivative of #2478)
++        s.add("org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp2.cpdsadapter.DriverAdapterCPDS");
++        s.add("org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp2.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource");
++        s.add("org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp2.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource");
++
+         // [databind#2999]: org.glassfish.web/javax.servlet.jsp.jstl (embedded Xalan)
+         // (derivative of #2469)
+         s.add("com.oracle.wls.shaded.org.apache.xalan.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool");
+ 
++        // [databind#3003]: another case of embedded Xalan (derivative of #2469)
++        s.add("org.docx4j.org.apache.xalan.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool");
++
+         DEFAULT_NO_DESER_CLASS_NAMES = Collections.unmodifiableSet(s);
+     }
+ 


=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2020-36518.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 17:30:19 +0200
+Subject: CVE-2020-36518
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1007109
+Origin: https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/83b928dab9ba6ef81cf48987fcd12071e1ddb0c9
+Origin: https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/fcfc4998ec23f0b1f7f8a9521c2b317b6c25892b
+---
+ .../deser/std/UntypedObjectDeserializer.java       | 134 ++++++++++++---------
+ .../deser/DeepNestingUntypedDeserTest.java         |  70 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 src/test/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/DeepNestingUntypedDeserTest.java
+
+diff --git a/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/std/UntypedObjectDeserializer.java b/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/std/UntypedObjectDeserializer.java
+index 7f4e220..97b5f6b 100644
+--- a/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/std/UntypedObjectDeserializer.java
++++ b/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/std/UntypedObjectDeserializer.java
+@@ -203,10 +203,9 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+      */
+     @Override
+     public boolean isCachable() {
+-        /* 26-Mar-2015, tatu: With respect to [databind#735], there are concerns over
+-         *   cachability. It seems like we SHOULD be safe here; but just in case there
+-         *   are problems with false sharing, this may need to be revisited.
+-         */
++        // 26-Mar-2015, tatu: With respect to [databind#735], there are concerns over
++        //   cachability. It seems like we SHOULD be safe here; but just in case there
++        //   are problems with false sharing, this may need to be revisited.
+         return true;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -243,9 +242,8 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+             if (_numberDeserializer != null) {
+                 return _numberDeserializer.deserialize(p, ctxt);
+             }
+-            /* Caller may want to get all integral values returned as {@link java.math.BigInteger},
+-             * or {@link java.lang.Long} for consistency
+-             */
++            // Caller may want to get all integral values returned as {@link java.math.BigInteger},
++            // or {@link java.lang.Long} for consistency
+             if (ctxt.hasSomeOfFeatures(F_MASK_INT_COERCIONS)) {
+                 return _coerceIntegral(p, ctxt);
+             }
+@@ -464,10 +462,9 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+-    /**********************************************************
+-    /* Separate "vanilla" implementation for common case of
+-    /* no custom deserializer overrides
+-    /**********************************************************
++    /**********************************************************************
++    /* Separate "vanilla" implementation for common case of no deser overrides
++    /**********************************************************************
+      */
+ 
+     @JacksonStdImpl
+@@ -476,69 +473,85 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+     {
+         private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
+ 
++        // Arbitrarily chosen.
++        // Introduced to resolve CVE-2020-36518 and as a temporary hotfix for #2816
++        private static final int MAX_DEPTH = 1000;
++
+         public final static Vanilla std = new Vanilla();
+ 
+         public Vanilla() { super(Object.class); }
+ 
+         @Override
+-        public Object deserialize(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt) throws IOException
++              public Object deserialize(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt) throws IOException {
++            return deserialize(p, ctxt, 0);
++        }
++
++        private Object deserialize(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt, int depth) throws IOException
+         {
+-            switch (p.getCurrentTokenId()) {
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_START_OBJECT:
+-                {
++            switch (p.currentTokenId()) {
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_START_OBJECT: {
+                     JsonToken t = p.nextToken();
+                     if (t == JsonToken.END_OBJECT) {
+-                        return new LinkedHashMap<String,Object>(2);
++                        return new LinkedHashMap<String, Object>(2);
+                     }
+                 }
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_FIELD_NAME:
+-                return mapObject(p, ctxt);
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_START_ARRAY:
+-                {
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_FIELD_NAME:
++                    if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) {
++                        throw new JsonParseException(p, "JSON is too deeply nested.");
++                    }
++
++                    return mapObject(p, ctxt, depth);
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_START_ARRAY: {
+                     JsonToken t = p.nextToken();
+                     if (t == JsonToken.END_ARRAY) { // and empty one too
+-                        if (ctxt.isEnabled(DeserializationFeature.USE_JAVA_ARRAY_FOR_JSON_ARRAY)) {
++                        if (ctxt.isEnabled(
++                            DeserializationFeature.USE_JAVA_ARRAY_FOR_JSON_ARRAY)) {
+                             return NO_OBJECTS;
+                         }
+                         return new ArrayList<Object>(2);
+                     }
+                 }
+-                if (ctxt.isEnabled(DeserializationFeature.USE_JAVA_ARRAY_FOR_JSON_ARRAY)) {
+-                    return mapArrayToArray(p, ctxt);
+-                }
+-                return mapArray(p, ctxt);
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_EMBEDDED_OBJECT:
+-                return p.getEmbeddedObject();
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_STRING:
+-                return p.getText();
+ 
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_NUMBER_INT:
+-                if (ctxt.hasSomeOfFeatures(F_MASK_INT_COERCIONS)) {
+-                    return _coerceIntegral(p, ctxt);
++                if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) {
++                    throw new JsonParseException(p, "JSON is too deeply nested.");
+                 }
+-                return p.getNumberValue(); // should be optimal, whatever it is
+ 
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_NUMBER_FLOAT:
+-                if (ctxt.isEnabled(DeserializationFeature.USE_BIG_DECIMAL_FOR_FLOATS)) {
+-                    return p.getDecimalValue();
++                if (ctxt.isEnabled(DeserializationFeature.USE_JAVA_ARRAY_FOR_JSON_ARRAY)) {
++                    return mapArrayToArray(p, ctxt, depth);
+                 }
+-                return p.getNumberValue();
++                return mapArray(p, ctxt, depth);
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_EMBEDDED_OBJECT:
++                    return p.getEmbeddedObject();
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_STRING:
++                    return p.getText();
++
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_NUMBER_INT:
++                    if (ctxt.hasSomeOfFeatures(F_MASK_INT_COERCIONS)) {
++                        return _coerceIntegral(p, ctxt);
++                    }
++                    return p.getNumberValue(); // should be optimal, whatever it is
+ 
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_TRUE:
+-                return Boolean.TRUE;
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_FALSE:
+-                return Boolean.FALSE;
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_NUMBER_FLOAT:
++                    if (ctxt.isEnabled(DeserializationFeature.USE_BIG_DECIMAL_FOR_FLOATS)) {
++                        return p.getDecimalValue();
++                    }
++                    return p.getNumberValue();
+ 
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_NULL: // should not get this but...
+-                return null;
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_TRUE:
++                    return Boolean.TRUE;
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_FALSE:
++                    return Boolean.FALSE;
+ 
+-            case JsonTokenId.ID_END_OBJECT:
+-                // 28-Oct-2015, tatu: [databind#989] We may also be given END_OBJECT (similar to FIELD_NAME),
+-                //    if caller has advanced to the first token of Object, but for empty Object
+-                return new LinkedHashMap<String,Object>(2);
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_END_OBJECT:
++                    // 28-Oct-2015, tatu: [databind#989] We may also be given END_OBJECT (similar to FIELD_NAME),
++                    //    if caller has advanced to the first token of Object, but for empty Object
++                    return new LinkedHashMap<String, Object>(2);
+ 
+-            //case JsonTokenId.ID_END_ARRAY: // invalid
+-            default:
++                case JsonTokenId.ID_NULL: // 08-Nov-2016, tatu: yes, occurs
++                    return null;
++
++                //case JsonTokenId.ID_END_ARRAY: // invalid
++                default:
+             }
+             return ctxt.handleUnexpectedToken(Object.class, p);
+         }
+@@ -581,15 +594,16 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+             return ctxt.handleUnexpectedToken(Object.class, p);
+         }
+ 
+-        protected Object mapArray(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt) throws IOException
++        protected Object mapArray(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt, int depth) throws IOException
+         {
+-            Object value = deserialize(p, ctxt);
++            ++depth;
++            Object value = deserialize(p, ctxt, depth);
+             if (p.nextToken()  == JsonToken.END_ARRAY) {
+                 ArrayList<Object> l = new ArrayList<Object>(2);
+                 l.add(value);
+                 return l;
+             }
+-            Object value2 = deserialize(p, ctxt);
++            Object value2 = deserialize(p, ctxt, depth);
+             if (p.nextToken()  == JsonToken.END_ARRAY) {
+                 ArrayList<Object> l = new ArrayList<Object>(2);
+                 l.add(value);
+@@ -603,7 +617,7 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+             values[ptr++] = value2;
+             int totalSize = ptr;
+             do {
+-                value = deserialize(p, ctxt);
++                value = deserialize(p, ctxt, depth);
+                 ++totalSize;
+                 if (ptr >= values.length) {
+                     values = buffer.appendCompletedChunk(values);
+@@ -620,12 +634,13 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+         /**
+          * Method called to map a JSON Object into a Java value.
+          */
+-        protected Object mapObject(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt) throws IOException
++        protected Object mapObject(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt, int depth) throws IOException
+         {
++            ++depth;
+             // will point to FIELD_NAME at this point, guaranteed
+             String key1 = p.getText();
+             p.nextToken();
+-            Object value1 = deserialize(p, ctxt);
++            Object value1 = deserialize(p, ctxt, depth);
+ 
+             String key2 = p.nextFieldName();
+             if (key2 == null) { // single entry; but we want modifiable
+@@ -634,7 +649,7 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+                 return result;
+             }
+             p.nextToken();
+-            Object value2 = deserialize(p, ctxt);
++            Object value2 = deserialize(p, ctxt, depth);
+ 
+             String key = p.nextFieldName();
+             if (key == null) {
+@@ -649,7 +664,7 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+             result.put(key2, value2);
+             do {
+                 p.nextToken();
+-                result.put(key, deserialize(p, ctxt));
++                result.put(key, deserialize(p, ctxt, depth));
+             } while ((key = p.nextFieldName()) != null);
+             return result;
+         }
+@@ -657,12 +672,13 @@ public class UntypedObjectDeserializer
+         /**
+          * Method called to map a JSON Array into a Java Object array (Object[]).
+          */
+-        protected Object[] mapArrayToArray(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt) throws IOException {
++        protected Object[] mapArrayToArray(JsonParser p, DeserializationContext ctxt, int depth) throws IOException {
++            ++depth;
+             ObjectBuffer buffer = ctxt.leaseObjectBuffer();
+             Object[] values = buffer.resetAndStart();
+             int ptr = 0;
+             do {
+-                Object value = deserialize(p, ctxt);
++                Object value = deserialize(p, ctxt, depth);
+                 if (ptr >= values.length) {
+                     values = buffer.appendCompletedChunk(values);
+                     ptr = 0;
+diff --git a/src/test/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/DeepNestingUntypedDeserTest.java b/src/test/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/DeepNestingUntypedDeserTest.java
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ad0194d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/test/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/DeepNestingUntypedDeserTest.java
+@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
++package com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.deser;
++
++import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonParseException;
++import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.BaseMapTest;
++import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
++import java.util.List;
++import java.util.Map;
++
++public class DeepNestingUntypedDeserTest extends BaseMapTest
++{
++  // 28-Mar-2021, tatu: Currently 3000 fails for untyped/Object,
++  //     4000 for untyped/Array
++  private final static int TOO_DEEP_NESTING = 4000;
++  private final static int NOT_TOO_DEEP = 1000;
++
++  private final ObjectMapper MAPPER = new ObjectMapper();
++
++  public void testTooDeepUntypedWithArray() throws Exception
++  {
++    final String doc = _nestedDoc(TOO_DEEP_NESTING, "[ ", "] ");
++    try {
++      MAPPER.readValue(doc, Object.class);
++      fail("Should have thrown an exception.");
++    } catch (JsonParseException jpe) {
++      assertTrue(jpe.getMessage().startsWith("JSON is too deeply nested."));
++    }
++  }
++
++  public void testUntypedWithArray() throws Exception
++  {
++    final String doc = _nestedDoc(NOT_TOO_DEEP, "[ ", "] ");
++    Object ob = MAPPER.readValue(doc, Object.class);
++    assertTrue(ob instanceof List<?>);
++  }
++
++  public void testTooDeepUntypedWithObject() throws Exception
++  {
++    final String doc = "{"+_nestedDoc(TOO_DEEP_NESTING, "\"x\":{", "} ") + "}";
++    try {
++      MAPPER.readValue(doc, Object.class);
++      fail("Should have thrown an exception.");
++    } catch (JsonParseException jpe) {
++      assertTrue(jpe.getMessage().startsWith("JSON is too deeply nested."));
++    }
++  }
++
++  public void testUntypedWithObject() throws Exception
++  {
++    final String doc = "{"+_nestedDoc(NOT_TOO_DEEP, "\"x\":{", "} ") + "}";
++    Object ob = MAPPER.readValue(doc, Object.class);
++    assertTrue(ob instanceof Map<?, ?>);
++  }
++
++  private String _nestedDoc(int nesting, String open, String close) {
++    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(nesting * (open.length() + close.length()));
++    for (int i = 0; i < nesting; ++i) {
++      sb.append(open);
++      if ((i & 31) == 0) {
++        sb.append("\n");
++      }
++    }
++    for (int i = 0; i < nesting; ++i) {
++      sb.append(close);
++      if ((i & 31) == 0) {
++        sb.append("\n");
++      }
++    }
++    return sb.toString();
++  }
++}


=====================================
debian/patches/series
=====================================
@@ -12,3 +12,8 @@ CVE-2018-19360.patch
 CVE-2019-12086.patch
 polymorphic-typing-issues.patch
 multiple-CVE-BeanDeserializerFactory.patch
+CVE-2020-25649.patch
+CVE-2020-24{616,750}.patch
+CVE-2020-35{490,491,728}.patch
+CVE-2020-361{79-90}.patch
+CVE-2020-36518.patch



View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/java-team/jackson-databind/-/compare/48d7dab2f85d8dcf9734521982601e2711913750...19f6e54d7c636400896eb0db971b411a8ba789e3

-- 
View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/java-team/jackson-databind/-/compare/48d7dab2f85d8dcf9734521982601e2711913750...19f6e54d7c636400896eb0db971b411a8ba789e3
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