[php-maint] PHP security policy review

Moritz Muehlenhoff jmm at inutil.org
Wed Jun 30 17:21:23 UTC 2010


On Tue, Jun 29, 2010 at 08:37:40PM -0500, Raphael Geissert wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> 
> While reviewing the security policy for PHP I noticed a few gaps which I think 
> are important to address.
> 
> At the moment I'd like to propose the following changes, so please comment and 
> feel free to propose others:
> 
> > --- a/debian/README.Debian.security
> > +++ b/debian/README.Debian.security
> > @@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
> > 
> >  the Debian stable security team does not provide security support
> > -for certain configurations known to be inherently insecure.  Most
> > -specifically, the security team will not provide support for flaws in:
> > +for certain configurations known to be inherently insecure.  This
> > +includes the interpreter itself, extensions, and code written in the
> > +PHP language. Most specifically, the security team will not provide
> > +support for flaws in:
> 
> To clarify that the policy applies to the interpreter and apps, which is how 
> it has been treated so far.
> 
> >  - problems which are not flaws in the design of php but can be problematic
> > -  when used by sloppy developers (for example, not checking the contents
> > -  of a tar file before extracting it).
> > +  when used by sloppy developers (for example: not checking the contents
> > +  of a tar file before extracting it, using unserialize() on
> > +  untrusted data, or relying on a specific value of short_open_tag).
> 
> To include unserialize() and ini settings such as short_open_tag. 
> 
> If there are no objections, I'm going to include that change in the next 
> upload and make it the policy for Squeeze. Unless there's a reason to 
> reconsider the policy applying lenny, it won't be updated to squeeze's.

Looks good to me.

Cheers,
        Moritz



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