[Pkg-cyrus-sasl2-commits] [cyrus-sasl2] 01/06: [CVE-2013-4122]: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()

[Ondřej Surý]

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ondrej pushed a commit to branch master
in repository cyrus-sasl2.

commit fde8b7f7440f3be2c286d5080f55a61b225cd068
Author: Ondřej Surý <ondrej at sury.org>
Date:   Wed Sep 23 14:35:28 2015 +0200

    [CVE-2013-4122]: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()
---
 debian/patches/CVE-2013-4122.patch | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 debian/patches/series              |   1 +
 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+)

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2013-4122.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2013-4122.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a51bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2013-4122.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mancha <mancha1 at hush.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 10:08:07 +0100
+Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()
+
+Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL
+(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,
+on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords
+passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).
+
+When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible
+NULL pointer dereference.
+
+Patch by mancha1 at hush.com.
+
+--- cyrus-sasl2.orig/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
++++ cyrus-sasl2/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid;
+ char *password;
+ {
+     char* r;
++    char* crpt_passwd;
+     struct passwd *pwd;
+ 
+     pwd = getpwnam(userid);
+@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;
+     else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
+ 	r = "Account disabled";
+     }
+-    else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	r = "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {
+--- cyrus-sasl2.orig/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
++++ cyrus-sasl2/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
+@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid;
+ char *password;
+ {
+     struct spwd *pwd;
++    char *crpt_passwd;
+ 
+     pwd = getspnam(userid);
+     if (!pwd) {
+ 	return "Userid not found";
+     }
+     
+-    if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {
++    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp);
++    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	return "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {
+--- cyrus-sasl2.orig/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
++++ cyrus-sasl2/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ {
+     /* VARIABLES */
+     struct passwd *pw;			/* pointer to passwd file entry */
++    char *crpt_passwd;			/* encrypted password */
+     int errnum;
+     /* END VARIABLES */
+   
+@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
+-    if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {
++    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd);
++    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login);
+ 	}
+--- cyrus-sasl2.orig/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
++++ cyrus-sasl2/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)");
+     }
+ 
+-    cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));
+-    if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {
++    cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp);
++    if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    /*
+ 	     * This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an
+@@ -222,10 +222,8 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",
+ 		   sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);
+ 	}
+-	free(cpw);
+ 	RETURN("NO Incorrect password");
+     }
+-    free(cpw);
+ 
+     /*
+      * The following fields will be set to -1 if:
+@@ -287,7 +285,7 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	RETURN("NO Invalid username");
+     }
+   
+-    if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",
+ 		   password, upw->upw_passwd);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index baae499..f2a97a3 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -31,3 +31,4 @@
 properly-create-libsasl2.pc.patch
 bug715040.patch
 early-hangup.patch
+CVE-2013-4122.patch

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