[pkg-wpa-devel] r1954 - in /wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian: ./ patches/ patches/2015-2/ patches/2015-3/ patches/2015-4/ patches/2015-5/
slh-guest at users.alioth.debian.org
slh-guest at users.alioth.debian.org
Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 UTC 2015
Author: slh-guest
Date: Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
New Revision: 1954
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/?sc=1&rev=1954
Log:
* Non-maintainer upload.
* Add patch to address CVE-2015-4141.
CVE-2015-4141: WPS UPnP vulnerability with HTTP chunked transfer
encoding. (Closes: #787372)
* Add patch to address CVE-2015-4142.
CVE-2015-4142: Integer underflow in AP mode WMM Action frame processing.
(Closes: #787373)
* Add patches to address CVE-2015-414{3,4,5,6}
CVE-2015-4143 CVE-2015-4144 CVE-2015-4145 CVE-2015-4146: EAP-pwd missing
payload length validation. (Closes: #787371)
* Add patch to address 2015-5 vulnerability.
NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser (Closes: #795740)
* Thanks to Julian Wollrath <jwollrath at web.de> for the initial debdiff
provided in #787371.
Added:
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-2/
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-3/
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-5/
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
Modified:
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/changelog
wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/series
Modified: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/changelog
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/changelog?rev=1954&op=diff
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/changelog (original)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/changelog Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
+wpa (2.3-2.2) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload.
+ * Add patch to address CVE-2015-4141.
+ CVE-2015-4141: WPS UPnP vulnerability with HTTP chunked transfer
+ encoding. (Closes: #787372)
+ * Add patch to address CVE-2015-4142.
+ CVE-2015-4142: Integer underflow in AP mode WMM Action frame processing.
+ (Closes: #787373)
+ * Add patches to address CVE-2015-414{3,4,5,6}
+ CVE-2015-4143 CVE-2015-4144 CVE-2015-4145 CVE-2015-4146: EAP-pwd missing
+ payload length validation. (Closes: #787371)
+ * Add patch to address 2015-5 vulnerability.
+ NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser (Closes: #795740)
+ * Thanks to Julian Wollrath <jwollrath at web.de> for the initial debdiff
+ provided in #787371.
+
+ -- Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil at debian.org> Sat, 31 Oct 2015 14:13:50 +0100
+
wpa (2.3-2.1) unstable; urgency=medium
* Non-maintainer upload.
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
+
+strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
+resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
+result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
+argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
+
+This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
+has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
+would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
+upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
+(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
+
+Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
+rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
+larger than the maximum configured body length.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
+index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
+--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
+@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
+ goto bad;
+ h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
++ h->chunk_size);
++ goto bad;
++ }
+ /* throw away chunk header
+ * so we have only real data
+ */
+--
+1.9.1
+
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
+
+The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
+length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
+negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
+buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
+so, resulting in segmentation fault.
+
+This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
+attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
+hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
+drivers).
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
+index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wmm.c
++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
+@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (left < 0)
++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
++
+ /* extract the tspec info element */
+ if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
+ hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
+--
+1.9.1
+
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index f2b0926..a629437 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ u16 offset;
+ u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
++ size_t prime_len, order_len;
++
++ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len,
++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++ goto fin;
++ }
+
+ if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
+@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ int offset;
+
++ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
+ * prf
+--
+1.9.1
+
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ int res = 0;
++ size_t prime_len, order_len;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+
++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len,
++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ int offset;
+
++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
+ grp = htons(data->group_num);
+ ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
+--
+1.9.1
+
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index a629437..1d2079b 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
+ */
+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++ if (len < 2) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
+ "total length = %d", tot_len);
+ if (tot_len > 15000)
+ return NULL;
++ if (data->inbuf) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
+--
+1.9.1
+
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ * the first fragment has a total length
+ */
+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++ if (len < 2) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++ return;
++ }
+ tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
+ "length = %d", tot_len);
+ if (tot_len > 15000)
+ return;
++ if (data->inbuf) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++ return;
++ }
+ data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
+--
+1.9.1
+
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
+
+The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
+whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
+fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
+for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
+triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
+due to invalid buffer allocation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ /*
+ * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
+ */
++ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
+ len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
+ if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
+ resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
+--
+1.9.1
+
Added: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch?rev=1954&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch (added)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
+
+It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
+wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
+length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
+2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
+payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
+bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
+This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
+heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
+same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
+In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
+would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
+infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
+
+Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
+attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
+sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
+the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
+received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
+that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
+hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
+here.
+
+Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
+detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *d
+ if (size < 6)
+ return -1;
+ record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
++ return -1;
+ pos += sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *d
+ pos += record->payload_length;
+
+ record->total_length = pos - data;
+- if (record->total_length > size)
++ if (record->total_length > size ||
++ record->total_length < record->payload_length)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
Modified: wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/series
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/series?rev=1954&op=diff
==============================================================================
--- wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/series (original)
+++ wpa/tags/2.3-2.2/debian/patches/series Mon Nov 23 00:16:23 2015
@@ -13,3 +13,11 @@
wpasupplicant_band_selection_a1b790eb.patch
wpasupplicant_band_selection_8b2b718d.patch
wpasupplicant_band_selection_aa517ae2.patch
+2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
+2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
+2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
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